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Sohini Kar 
Accepted Manuscript for Signs 
Securitizing Women: Gender, Precaution, and Risk in Indian Finance 
 In its annual Union Budget in March 2013, the Government of India made a 
surprising announcement: it would be setting up a new public sector bank for women.1 This 
new bank would be headed by, largely staffed by, and serving mostly women (i.e., men could 
have accounts, but not receive all forms of credit or benefits from the bank). The first seven 
branches of the Bharatiya Mahila Bank (the Indian Women’s Bank, or BMB), including its 
headquarters in the capital of New Delhi, were inaugurated by then-Prime Minister 
Manmohan Singh on November 19, 2013; symbolically falling on the birth anniversary of 
Indira Gandhi, India’s first and only female Prime Minister to date.  
A few months before the Union Budget announcement, in December 2012, a young 
woman had been gang raped and brutalized in the Indian capital of Delhi when she had gone 
out to see a movie with a male friend. The two were attacked on a bus, and the young 
woman, Jyoti Singh Pandey, eventually died of the injuries inflicted during the assault. News 
of the rape mobilized massive protests across India and called international attention to the 
growing number of sexual assaults and the systematic harassment of women in public spaces 
(Shandilya 2015). The new women’s bank was one of the government’s responses to 
demands for the state to address gender inequality in India.  
Along with the new bank, then-Finance Minister P. Chidambaram announced the 
establishment of the Rs. 10 billion (around US$160 million) “Nirbhaya Fund” to support 
non-governmental organizations and institutions working on gender issues. Nirbhaya, 
meaning “the fearless one,” was one of the pseudonyms given by the public to the initially-
                                                
1 In India, there are public sector (including government majority shareholder) and private 
sector banks.  
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unnamed rape victim.2 In the year since Pandey’s death, while the fund in her memory 
remained largely untouched (Shaji 2014), the new women’s bank had come into fruition as a 
financialized and profitable response to the assault on a woman’s body. The creation of this 
new financial institution highlighted important intersections of security, finance, and gender. 
Although financial and social empowerment of poor women in India is widely known 
through microfinance programs, the BMB adapted this narrative for women across class. 
Having a bank uniquely for women, then, ultimately culminated in a process of financializing 
gender empowerment policies in India.  
Although the BMB reported net profits of Rs. 190 million (around US$ 2.8 million) in 
its second year, up seven million from its first year of operation (BMB 2015) and with low 
levels of bad debts, it was announced in 2016 that it would be merged with the State Bank of 
India in line with a new government policy of bank consolidation. At the helm of this merger 
would be Arundhati Bhattacharya, the female Chair-Managing Director of India’s largest 
commercial bank. In India, the narrative of a bank for women parallels a second narrative 
about gender and banking: that about women in banking. Notably, the argument that financial 
inclusion is needed for women’s empowerment is met with the irony that women lead banks 
in globally unprecedented numbers in India. In this highly gender-unequal country, it is 
striking that around 40 percent of banking assets are controlled by women-headed banks. In 
this respect, Indian women challenge an almost global dominance of men in the upper 
echelons of finance.  
How can we tell these two stories of women and finance in India? While seeming to 
offer divergent narratives of gender and finance, I argue that ultimately the two map onto an 
emergent notion of precaution (Ewald 2002) that sustains rather than challenge the dominant 
paradigm of capitalist patriarchy in an era of financialization. In both cases, women are 
                                                
2 Under Indian law, names of rape victims are not released to the public.  
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enfolded into the project of financial expansion, whether as resources for, or managers of, 
finance capital, while avoiding substantial changes to gendered access to public space and 
expectations of security.   
 
Lateral Narratives 
 Before examining the two cases, a brief word on the methodological and analytic 
approach. On the one hand, the narratives of the bank for women and that of women in 
banking do not necessarily intersect. On the other, it is impossible to speak of one without the 
other. They speak to each other, though perhaps in ways that are not always clear or coherent. 
Drawing inspiration from Bill Maurer’s notion of lateral reason, I offer “neither description, 
nor explanation as such, but dense lateralizations with objects and subjects that are already 
densely lateralized with each other” (2005, 17). At times these narratives intersect, at other 
times they diverge in productive but unexpected ways; “they are not always mutually 
reinforcing. They sometimes cavort promiscuously with another” (Maurer 2005, 17). One 
does not explain the other, but their juxtaposition shows spaces of critical inquiry on the 
question of security, gender, and finance.    
This article unpacks the two stories laterally, demonstrating their curious intersections 
and departures. It examines the discursive practices through which women and banking are 
constructed in relation to ideas of empowerment, space, and risk. I primarily examine 
publicly available material from banks (press releases, annual reports, and websites), media 
reports, particularly financial news and interviews with key figures, and publicly available 
speeches. Through these materials, I show how even as the BMB seeks to empower women 
across class with a plethora of new credit facilities, it does so in a particularly gendered way 
that reinforces rather than challenges forms of gender inequality while ensuring economic 
security and financial expansion. Examination of women in finance meanwhile rethinks the 
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production of finance and banking as distinctly masculine spaces and work. Closer scrutiny 
of the rise of women in Indian banking, however, shows how histories of social banking 
produced certain banking spaces and practices as particularly amenable for women through 
notions of care, diligence, and safety. Both narratives hinge on privileging economic security 
and precaution over social and political risk.  
 
Securitizing Women, Securing Finance 
 In the immediate aftermath of the Delhi rape case, popular protests engulfed major 
cities in India. In Delhi, as crowds swelled, the government banned groups of more than five 
people from assembling. Riot police were mobilized to control the demonstrators, using 
baton charges, water cannon, and teargas to disperse the crowds. Anger from the crowds was 
directed not only at the rapists, but also what they perceived to be ineffectual systems of 
governance and policing. A “social stress test” for India (Desai and Joshi 2012), the protests 
marked the need for the government to address not just justice for Jyoti Singh Pandey, but 
also the anger of the wider public which threatened social upheaval.   
Following these widespread demonstrations, the operational risk management 
company Pinkerton and the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry 
(FICCI), the largest business association in India, jointly released the annual India Risk 
Survey (IRS 2013). Addressed to the corporate sector, it claimed that while India had 
emerged as “an attractive investment destination… the factor of risk has evolved as one of 
the parameters impacting investment and decision making in business” (IRS 2013, 4). 
According to the report, risks, such as terrorist attacks and labor unrest, lead to adverse 
effects on the economy and ultimately to the withdrawal of foreign investments. Yet the most 
significant of the possible risks in India is that of “enhanced politicization, increased violence 
and insouciance towards likely consequences” (IRS 2013, 16). The consequences of such 
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unrest “may include economic downturn, public aggravation and citizen safety… [making] 
civic disturbances the highest rated risk in India.” (IRS 2013, 16). An active civil society that 
makes demands on the state through protest was perceived as a threat to economic stability. 
In particular, the report highlights the protests mobilized in the wake of the Delhi rape case as 
cause for concern: 
The demonstrations related to national and social causes have also been attended in 
large numbers. The primary being agitations initiated against corruption and protests 
against brutal rape and murder in Delhi influencing countrywide demand of enhanced 
women safety. These demonstrations not only cause widespread traffic congestion but 
also ended up in a violent scuffle between protestors and the authorities on quite a few 
occasions (IRS 2013, 16). 
Rather than addressing the persistent problem of sexual violence against women that had led 
to the demonstrations, the report highlights the risks posed by the protests themselves, 
including traffic congestion that blocked the capital’s arteries. Along with labor unrest, 
demonstrations rooted in social movements are identified as the source of economic risk. 
Social unrest and economic risk were inextricably linked in the report. In contrast to the high 
risks of “national causes,” or protests, workplace violence and sexual harassment rank low as 
causes for concern for corporate India, where they are listed as the lowest of 12 risk factors 
and are “not perceived as a threat to the functioning of business” (IRS 2013, 6). If protests 
emerged out of concerns for women’s security, the security apparatus quickly moved to 
contain these risks and uncertainties, particularly as it threatened economic stability (cf. 
Zeiderman et al 2015). The city would have to be secured for capital to flow.    
Risk-taking and hedging are increasingly at the heart of contemporary finance 
capitalism (Ho 2010; LiPuma and Lee 2002). There is a need to ensure a certain kind of risk 
environment that secures the market more broadly and contains undesirable risk. Market 
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volatility in and of itself is considered acceptable, if not necessary, to modern markets. 
Threats to the economy, however, must be contained; the economic sphere has to be secured. 
Yet risk assessments like the IRS “can give no account of deliberative political and physical 
risk-taking” (Douglas 1992, 41). Effectively, as Mary Douglas has argued, “all this means is 
that the commercial, risk-averse culture has locally vanquished the risk-seeking culture, and 
writes off the latter as pathological or abnormal” (1992, 41). The protests demanding social 
change becomes dangerous to economic stability, and the government and corporate response 
becomes one of risk-containment. 
From the risk society (Beck 1992), there has been a turn toward what François Ewald 
(2002) calls precaution. With precaution, the goal is to “prevent certain risks from being 
taken” (Ewald 2002, 296). Where economic risk exceeds political risk, as in the case of the 
Delhi protests, there is an attempt to contain civil unrest. Indeed, as the Secretary General of 
FICCI writes in his Forward to the IRS, “in order to stimulate growth, we need a risk free 
environment. India needs to urgently identify and assess factors that may jeopardise its 
economic achievements and could hinder future progress” (2013, Foreword, emphasis 
added). A risk free environment is also one in which there are no challenges to the status quo, 
protests against structures of inequality, or demands for social justice. In the quest for “zero 
risk,” the precautionary principle veers away from risky social changes that may challenge a 
particular social order. At its heart is a conservatism that pushes forward on a certain vision 
of progress over those that may invoke greater risk in the form of challenging existing social 
structures.    
 
What we talk about when we talk about empowerment 
In the 2013 Union Budget speech announcing the BMB, the Finance Minister closed 
with a reference to the Delhi rape case and a promise to women:  
 7 
We have a collective responsibility to ensure the dignity and safety of women. Recent 
incidents have cast a long, dark shadow on our liberal and progressive credentials. As 
more women enter public spaces—for education or work or access to services or 
leisure—there are more reports of violence against them. We stand in solidarity with 
our girl children and women. And we pledge to do everything possible to empower 
them and to keep them safe and secure.  
In the wake of the protests, the government emerged with a precautionary note: the 
government offered to secure women’s bodies in newly created public spaces. These spaces, 
however, came from within the economic sphere through the establishment of the BMB. 
Precaution, then, dictated securing women by expanding a financial sector, and securitizing 
women’s bodies through financial empowerment.  
The discourse of empowerment through financial inclusion has been normalized for 
poor women globally through development policies and institutions, such as microfinance. 
What is distinct about the BMB from microfinance more generally is that it extends the 
discourse of economic empowerment to women across class. “The economic empowerment 
of women of a country leads to exponential growth of the country. Every woman has her own 
individual strengths and skills. We believe that empowerment of every woman from all strata 
of society is vital for the growth of the entire nation,” reads a quote from BMB Executive 
Director S.M. Swathi on the website of the bank. With this vision of economic 
empowerment, the BMB sets out its mission “to be a bank of choice for all women… [and] 
facilitating inclusive growth through access to financial services” [emphasis added]. Here, the 
reference is not the joint enterprise of poverty alleviation and women’s empowerment, but a 
more generalized notion of women’s empowerment, and its attendant effect on the wellbeing 
of the nation’s economic growth overall.  
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A recent buzzword of development (Cornwall and Brock 2005), there is little 
agreement on what constitutes women’s empowerment, what this would entail, or how it 
would be measured. Nevertheless, the BMB seeks, through credit facilities and financial 
inclusion, to empower all women. Emerging in the 1990s, the discourse of empowerment 
originated in feminist critiques of development policies that failed to account for structural 
forms of gender inequalities (cf. Razavi and Miller 1995). Naila Kabeer (1999), for instance, 
defines empowerment as the process through which those who were denied the ability to 
make choices (i.e., disempowered) were able to do so. Power is central to these feminist 
arguments that challenged various forms of structural oppression. Yet the feminist critiques 
dovetailed with the neoliberal dismantling of welfare programs, and there was a “conceptual 
sleight of hand by which ‘end of welfare’ (and of ‘dependence’) becomes coded as 
‘empowerment’” (Sharma 2008, xvi). That is, in “a fine instance of the cunning of history,” 
(Fraser 2009) the utopian visions of second-wave feminism were incorporated selectively 
into the emergent neoliberal form of capitalism. Doing away with the structural aspects of 
feminist arguments on empowerment, the neoliberal framework enshrined the individual as 
the key agent of his or her own betterment.  
Microfinance, particularly microcredit, became a pertinent ally of neoliberal 
empowerment programs. It was popularized globally in the 1990s and 2000s, with the 
Grameen Bank, which pioneered the joint liability group model, winning the Nobel Peace 
Prize in 2006. Proponents argued that collateral-free credit to poor (disempowered) women 
would enable them to start small businesses, and effectively pull themselves out of poverty. 
Aligning with an economic order’s emphasis on “competition, efficiency, and 
entrepreneurship,” (Karim 2011, xiii) microfinance organizations encouraged women to use 
credit as a resource to empower themselves socially and economically. Moreover, as 
 9 
commercial or for-profit microfinance has expanded, credit to poor women has become a 
valuable source of finance capital (Kar & Schuster 2016). 
The framework of empowerment that the BMB draws upon, with its emphasis on 
credit and financial inclusion, is similar to microfinance. According to its mission statement, 
the BMB strives to empower women by eliminating lending bias, promoting asset ownership, 
supporting women’s livelihood, supporting self-help groups (i.e., microfinance programs), 
and promoting financial literacy. Although microfinance lending through self-help groups is 
one part of the BMB’s goals to increase lending to poor women, it is not the only or primary 
one.3 Rather, it has a more diversified lending portfolio that offers a range of financial 
products targeting middle-class women. Specifically, the bank offers retail loans such as 
housing, car, and education loans, some of which have concessions for women.  
The BMB offered loans to women in a particularly gendered way that reinscribed 
women within particular spaces (the domestic sphere) and particular kinds of work 
(predominantly care-work). For instance, it offered a number of special collateral-free loans 
for women to establish catering services and day care centers. Another collateral-free loan, 
offered through a tie-up with Indian beauty brands Naturals, CavinKare, and Lakme is 
designed to help women open and run beauty parlors. Finally, there is a special women’s loan 
for kitchen modernization, with the tagline “efficient kitchen. Efficient mahila [woman]” (cf. 
Searle 2015). While collateral-free, the loans ranging in amounts from have relatively short 
repayment periods. For instance, the kitchen modernization loans are available in amounts 
ranging from Rs. 50,000 – 500,000 to be repaid in seven years at an interest rate of around 12 
percent.  
                                                
3 Commercial banks lend to joint liability groups formed by women as self-help groups. In 
the absence of material collateral, group members guarantee each other’s loans.  
 10 
The BMB encoded women’s work and spaces through their loan offerings, and is 
reflected in the images advertising the various financial products. All the images feature a 
stylized feminine stick figure that is also the logo of the BMB. The figure is either in or near 
a domestic or distinctly gendered space. Even for a savings or a car loan, there is a house in 
the background, symbolizing a woman’s key role in the domestic sphere. Other loans for 
catering or childcare services feature women in gendered spaces providing care-work (cf. 
England 2005). Only two of the images do not feature a domestic space: that for the 
small/medium-sized enterprise (SME) loan, in which there is an industrial background, and 
for the education loan, featuring a university building.     
In the South Asian context, arguments around women’s empowerment have 
frequently centered on how to improve a woman’s position within the household. Even 
though women may have greater say over finances in the domestic sphere (cf. Zelizer 1989), 
they do not necessarily control household finances, even in cases where they are contributing 
to the household income (Dutta 2010). The burden is for women to sustain familial peace and 
wellbeing by deferring to her husband (and typically later her son) for the major financial 
decisions of the household. In other words, income-earning alone does not structurally 
change the struggles over household power dynamics (cf. Hartmann 1981).  
Studies in microfinance have found that women’s access to credit similarly does not 
necessarily change power dynamics within the household, and can even lead to increased 
levels of domestic violence (Goetz and Gupta 1996, Leach and Sitaram 2002). While 
acknowledging that credit alone does not empower women, some scholars have argued that 
social capital built among group members can lead to women challenging domestic violence 
(Sanyal 2002). Despite the mixed results on empowerment within the household, there is 
even less examination of what are the related consequences of financial inclusion and 
women’s experience of public spaces (cf. Noponen 2003). In particular, given the BMB was 
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founded in response to the Delhi rape case, there is little to suggest how or whether access to 
credit changes women’s experiences of violence in male-dominated public spaces.  
 
Precautious Empowerment  
In 2011, I was conducting research on microfinance in the city of Kolkata, when I met 
with Madhu.4 In her late 30s, Madhu was working with a self-help group (SHG) making 
decorative buntings and skirts for export to Japan and to the United Kingdom through a fair 
trade organization. The group had been organized by a non-governmental organization 
(NGO) focused on women’s rights. Along with gender-based activism, the NGO offered 
microcredit and livelihood training to women.  
Madhu was being trained as the buyer for the group, going to Burra Bazar—the 
wholesale district in Kolkata—at least twice a month to buy materials. “When I started, I 
didn’t know anything,” Madhu explained. She had started out by accompanying one of the 
male NGO-workers, and he had taught her the ropes of being a buyer in the wholesale 
markets. “I can do this on my own now,” Madhu noted with a hint of pride. I asked if she 
encountered any problems. “It’s far away and the journey [on the bus] is bumpy and crowded 
[dhakka khete khete jete hoi]. There are also the shoves [dhakka] in Burra Bazar from men 
who see women doing this kind of work,” Madhu explained. Just as there are bumps [dhakka] 
on the road, there are pushes [dhakka] from men in spaces from which women are typically 
excluded. Unlike the other women in her group who worked largely out of the safe small 
workshop in the NGO’s offices, Madhu had to experience and challenge masculine public 
spaces of the wholesale market. Empowerment in public spaces did not automatically come 
with access to credit. Rather, Madhu experienced new forms of violence in the gendered 
public spaces of the wholesale market.  
                                                
4 Name changed for anonymity. 
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Madhu’s experience of masculine public spaces was not unique. With parents who 
supported her education and aspirations, Jyoti Singh Pandey experienced gendered violence 
in the public, not private sphere. This not to say that therefore domestic violence should be 
underplayed in the Indian context. Rather, there is thus a double-edge sword in the narrative 
of women’s empowerment: the ability to work outside the home requires women also 
challenge masculine public spaces and the ideology and practices that sustain it. The question 
remains whether the special loans from BMB ensconce women within designated female 
spaces, rather than question the hegemony of masculine spaces.  
Working women across class in India must constantly navigate between the public 
(masculine) spaces of work and the expectations and norms of the (feminine) domestic 
sphere, especially once married.5 According to census data, women in Indian cities tend to 
travel less shorter distances and on slower transport to get to places of work, and more 
frequently work from home (Rao 2016). Scholars have long pointed to the ways in which 
gender relations are shaped by space and place (Massey 1994; Rosaldo 1974). One of the 
ideals of the Indian Hindu housewife is the Grihalakshmi or “Lakshmi (goddess of wealth) of 
the household” (Berry 2003). Often it is only upper-caste and upper-class women whose 
labor remains within the domestic sphere who can embody the ideal. As more middle-class 
women enter the workforce, however, they face the pressures to ensure that they adhere to 
what Smitha Radhakrishnan calls “respectable femininity” that is “gutsy, professional and yet 
distinctly ‘Indian’ in its prioritization of family” (2011, 51). Meanwhile, working class 
women who have long had to work outside of the household are marked as inauspicious (R. 
Chatterjee 1993, Ray and Qayum 2009). Indian women face the countervailing pressures of 
                                                
5 Postcolonial scholarship has identified how the Nationalists demarcated the inside world of 
the “home” as distinct from the “outside” world. Women came to mark the particular Indian 
identity that would be distinct from the European outside (P. Chatterjee 1993).  
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being modern, empowered, and independent, while also abiding by the entrenched patriarchal 
ideology of feminine domesticity. Across class, access to finance or credit does not 
necessarily allow women to engage public spaces; rather, it enables what I call “precautious 
empowerment” or empowerment programs that contain or manage social and political risk 
over structural change. Access to credit can become a way to secure and sustain the physical 
and spiritual security of the gendered domestic sphere rather than challenge the masculine 
public.  
On the tie-up with Lakme for beauty parlors, BMB Managing Director Usha 
Ananthasubramanian explained: “women have a natural inclination towards beauty and 
naturally excel in such sectors” (BMB 2015). Through its credit options, the BMB pushed 
women to work in industries and spaces that were naturalized as feminine, such as beauty 
services, childcare, and cooking. Yet these naturalized skills were also tied into gendered 
spaces. The precautionary attempt to empower women through work simultaneously keeps 
them within secure spaces that do not challenged patriarchic structures; rather, it naturalizes 
and sustains gendered forms of care-work.  
In India, a cultural and indeed political reading of risk suggests that risk is 
increasingly tied to securing the economic sphere (cf. Douglas 1992); it is about securitizing 
women’s bodies without securing their freedom of movement. Critiquing such a 
precautionary turn, Flavia Agnes has suggested for a conceptual move “to shift away from 
the notion of a vulnerable subject to that the risk-taking subject” (2006, 12).  That is, to 
consider how women “negotiate the terms of their own movement,” (ibid). Similarly, Shilpa 
Phadke, writing of safety in public spaces in Mumbai, argues for women to have “the right to 
take risks” (2007, 1510) despite the threats of physical assault or reputational loss. The 
argument of “risk as empowering” (Menon 2012, 142) contests the domestication of 
empowerment through neoliberal policies. Nivedita Menon argues that the idea of risk 
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“challenges the idea that women should live in a pervasive culture of fear, and rather, 
emphasizes that in their actual lives, women continuously surmount fear” (2012, 143). The 
BMB meanwhile produces women as vulnerable subjects whose safety can only be secured 
through their enclosure within domestic spaces and gendered work. In comparison to 
precautious empowerment, the risk-taking subject moves into these dangerous spaces, 
challenging the status quo in the gendered division of space.  
Madhu, the buyer for the group making handicrafts, encountered the risks of public 
spaces every time she ventured to the wholesale district. Despite these dangers, she ventured 
into these masculine spaces, reclaiming part of it, even as she felt the risks of these incursions 
on her body. This is not to say that women like Madhu should face the violence of entering 
public space, but that her entry should not be limited by precaution. Moreover, singular actors 
cannot transform socially extensive and historically deep practices of gender exclusion. 
Madhu does, however, offer a glimpse of how the risk-taking subject pushes against the 
constraints of acceptable risk—or risk that is contained within culturally-acceptable gendered 
spaces.  
 
Of Money and Men 
While BMB’s Anathasubramanian promoted loans for women in areas they were seen 
to be naturally excelling at, her own experiences and career trajectory offer a seemingly 
striking counterexample to gendered work. With a master’s degree in statistics, she had 
entered the banking sector in the 1980s, working her way up the ladder to one of the most 
senior positions in Indian banking. In 2015, following her stint at the BMB, 
Anathasubramanian became the Managing Director and CEO of Punjab National Bank, one 
of the “Big Four” banks in India. At the time of writing, of the big four, the largest three 
(State Bank of India, ICICI, and PNB) now have female heads of banks. How was it that 
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Indian women came to lead in a sector almost globally dominated by men and naturalized as 
masculine?  
In 2010 Christine Lagarde (then France’s finance minister, and later the managing 
director of the International Monetary Fund) quipped that “if Lehman Brothers had been 
‘Lehman Sisters,’ today’s economic crisis would look quite different” (Lagarde 2010). As the 
global economy reeled from the US sub-prime crisis, many have sought to locate its origins 
in the culture of masculinity in finance. Post-crisis cultural representations of excessive 
masculinity in the global centers of finance have also appeared films such as the Wolf of Wall 
Street (2013, Dir. Martin Scorcese). From the ritualized chest-thumping to the sexualization 
of women in the workplace, masculinity pervades and triumphs in this representation of 
finance. Though a hyper-stylized imagining of finance culture, the film remains ambiguous in 
whether it condemns or celebrates Wall Street: Boys, it seems to suggest, will be boys. Yet a 
number of recent lawsuits for sex discrimination filed by female employees against major 
financial institutions in North America and Europe, including Goldman Sachs, J.P. Morgan 
and Bank of America, point to the very real experiences of banks as gendered spaces, with 
claims of unequal compensation and hostile work environments.6  
 Recent studies of risk-taking among bankers allude to the biological basis of such 
behavior. In a 2008 study, Coren Apicella and her colleagues relate higher levels of 
testosterone and more masculine faces to greater risk-taking among bankers. Based on 
evolutionary biology, the authors argue that as money comes to represent a person’s ability to 
                                                
6 In 2013, a US federal court approved Bank of America’s $39 million settlement for claims 
on behalf of 4,800 female financial advisors who were denied more lucrative accounts, paid 
less than their male counterparts, and faced retaliation if they complained (CNBC 2013). J.P. 
Morgan Chase (Chaudhuri and Trottman 2014) and Goldman Sachs (Croft 2015) have settled 
similar cases. 
 16 
acquire resources, the object of masculine financial risk-taking behavior is to attract women 
seeking security. Similarly, John Coates, a trader turned neuroscientist, has argued that higher 
levels of testosterone in male traders is linked to greater profitability for reasons including the 
appetite for risk and “fearlessness in the face of novelty” (Coates and Herbert 2008, 6170). A 
study in economic psychology finds risk-taking to be a masculine (gender-based) trait 
(Meier-Pesti and Penz 2008). While Apicella et al and Coates and Herbert settle the risk 
taking behavior on a biological basis, Meir-Pesti and Penz suggest that this behavior emerges 
from gendered constructions of masculinity. All, however, agree on an inherent link between 
risk-taking and masculinity. 
 A number of recent ethnographies have more critically documented how gendered 
notions pervade cultures of finance (Fisher 2013; Ho 2009; Roth 2006; Zaloom 2006). In her 
work on traders in Chicago and London, Caitlin Zaloom (2006) notes how sexual language of 
male domination worked to keep women feeling out-of-place in the dealing room. This 
production of masculinity, particularly as “predatory market machismo” (Fisher 2013, 99), is 
seen as central to the competitive risk-taking practices of contemporary global finance. 
Linking high finance to the everyday struggles of the poor, Megan Moodie argues that “risky 
masculine investment” often relies on “a feminine terrain of work and activity both in the 
sense that it is rendered subordinate” (2014, 280). Here again, masculine financial risk-taking 
is held in tension with the invisible but necessary forms of women’s labor.   
My point, however, is not simply to revisit a debate of biological determinism of sex 
versus the cultural constructions of gender as they relate to financial risk-taking and 
responsibility. Rather, I am interested in how women came to succeed at the upper levels of 
India banking sector, and what it might tell us about the naturalization of finance as 
masculine. It is important to remember that women in India do not dominate across all levels 
of banking, as they do at the top. Only elite women have been able to transcend this 
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masculine space. Yet these women also offer a different perspective to thinking about the 
intersection of gender and finance.  
   
Women at the Top 
  In 2013, with the appointment of Arundhati Bhattacharya as Chair-Managing 
Director of the public sector State Bank of India—the largest commercial sector bank in 
India—women in India came to oversee over 40 percent of the industry’s assets 
(Unnikrishnan 2013). These women include heads of domestic public and private sector 
banks, as well as country heads of foreign banks.7 In comparison, in American Banker’s 2013 
list of the 25 most powerful women in banking in the United States, only three were heads of 
their banks (Basu and Bhattacharya 2013). Given high levels of workplace gender 
discrimination and low levels of women’s participation in formal labor more broadly in India, 
senior women bankers have come to dominate the boys’ club of banking in India.8  
Indian women in banking reflect what Melissa Fisher has called “market feminism” 
or the way in which women in finance embrace some aspects of Wall Street, while 
“advocating specific tenets of liberal and cultural feminism” (2012, 8). Similarly, with the 
advent of Facebook COO Sheryl Sandberg’s Lean In movement and debates about whether 
women can “have it all,” there has been an emerging critique of the alliance of feminism and 
                                                
7 Heads of domestic banks include: Chanda Kochhar (ICICI Bank), Vijayalakshmi Iyer (Bank 
of India), Shikha Sharma (Axis Bank), Shubhalakshmi Panse (Allahabad Bank), and Archana 
Bhargava (United Bank of India). Country heads of foreign-owned banks include: Kalpana 
Morparia (JP Morgan India), Meera Sanyal (RBS India), and Naina Lal Kidwai (HSBC 
India). 
8 The International Labor Organization (2013) reports that female workforce participation in 
India fell from 37 percent in 2004-2005 to 29 percent in 2009-2010. 
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neoliberalism (Fraser 2009, Rottenberg 2014, Williams 2014). As Christine Williams points 
out, “the basic message of Lean In is that women are disadvantaged in career development 
due to internalized sexism” (2014, 58). That is, it is not structural, but internalized oppression 
that is holding women back. Women in finance do not challenge the capitalist logics that 
produce and reproduce forms of inequality and discrimination, which have systematically 
disempowered women. Moreover, financialization has been at the heart of ascendant 
capitalist accumulation processes, as more and more people are drawn into networks of 
global finance. Senior women bankers are as responsible as much as their male counterparts 
in sustaining these processes of capitalist accumulation.  
Elite women heading banks in India do, however, challenge the global hegemonic 
norms of masculinity in finance. Nevertheless, these women’s position in a dominantly 
masculine space of finance needs to be read against the grain of a singular reason (cf. Bear et 
al). The rise of women in Indian banking is not simply a narrative of neoliberal feminism. 
Rather, it is intertwined with the history of social banking and the legacy of unions that have 
propelled women into senior positions in the Indian banking sector.  
Many of the women who are now heads of such financial institutions in India started 
their careers in the 1980s, in the era of nationalized banks. In 1969, Prime Minister Indira 
Gandhi nationalized Indian banks through the Banking Laws (Amendment) Act. The move 
was in response to critiques that major industrialists were monopolizing credit at the expense 
of other areas such as agriculture (Torri 1975). Nationalization also furthered “social 
banking,” or the government’s leveraging of the banking sector for developmental ends, 
particularly credit allocation. Nationalization reshaped the financial environment not just for 
banking customers and investors, but also for bank workers through new recruitment policies 
and unionization activities.  
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Nationalization led to new direct recruitment policies allowing greater diversity of 
candidates to enter the doors of banking, including women. Under nationalization, women’s 
employment in finance and insurance (public and private sectors) increased 237 percent 
between 1975 and 1988 (Gothoskar 1995). While there was increased women’s participation 
in most industries, as Sujata Gothoskar (1995) points out, the 237 percent increase in finance 
and insurance can be compared to increases of 26 percent in agriculture, 22 percent in 
manufacturing, 150 percent in electricity, 15 percent in construction, and 77 percent in 
community services. Thus, financial services in India have become feminized at a much 
faster pace than other sectors.  
Just as bank nationalization helped to recruit women into banking through public 
sector banks, liberalization of the banking sector has led to a shrinking number of women at 
clerical and subordinate levels (Bezbaruagh 2015). While private sector and foreign banks 
continue to recruit women in management positions, with emphasis on efficiency, they 
generally hire fewer staff overall. In response to these shifts, in 2008 the government 
appointed the Khandelwal Committee (2010) to look into human resources issues at public 
sector banks. The report found that 17 percent of 78,000 public sector bank employees were 
women, with only 2.66 percent at the executive cadre. The report pushed for greater 
recruitment, training, and retention of female employees. Written at a time when there were 
no Chief Managing Directors of public sector banks, the report emphasized the need to 
groom women for executive positions. Additionally, women would be able to take two-year 
sabbaticals mid-career to attend to familial obligations. In this way, public sector banks, 
through direct state intervention, have worked to make the sector more amenable to women. 
A second factor for women’s participation in the banking sector has been the strong 
presence of unions. The All India Bank Employees Association (AIBEA) was established in 
1946, the National Confederation of Bank Employees (NCBE) in 1970, and the All India 
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Bank Officers Confederation (AIBOC) in 1985. In recent years, India has avoided major 
direct effects of financial crises, including the 1997 Asian crisis and the more recent 2008 
sub-prime crisis. One of the reasons for this has been the relatively higher levels of bank 
regulations and slower pace of liberalization of the financial sector in India due to union 
pressures. In other words, the unionization of bank workers, including demands for restricted 
liberalization, has helped to create a more stable financial sector in which women were 
promoted. In 1995, a women’s wing of AIBEA was established to address concerns of 
women officers in the banks. In addition to petitioning for better working conditions as with 
the umbrella union, the women’s wing sought to raise issues of women’s leadership and 
gender equality, including calling for paternity leave (Hensman 2003).  
Bank nationalization and strong union representation have provided a unique financial 
environment for Indian bank employees compared to global practices. Social banking gave a 
cadre a women the opportunity and structural conditions to succeed within the banking 
system, including the current private sector. That is, because the major Indian private banks 
like ICICI were privatized after liberalization, women such as CEO Chanda Kochhar entered 
the ranks in an era of nationalized banking. While women in senior positions in banking 
today have reaped the benefits of India’s nationalized social banking system, liberalization 
has reformulated some of these aspects, emphasizing efficiency over long-term, stable 
employment. Even post-liberalization, as seen with the Khandelwal Committee’s 
recommendations, the state, not the private sector, has been key in pushing for women’s 
success in banking.  
 
“Money is Always Glamour” 
Women entering banking in the 1970s and 80s found an environment that Arundhati 
Bhattacharya of SBI describes as “not hostile to women [but] it was very male-dominated” 
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(Crabtree 2014). She explains: “The difficulties that we had were more basic – whether there 
would be a separate women’s toilet and things like that in some of the smaller branches, 
because they may never have seen a woman on staff” (Crabtree 2014). Unlike arguments of 
testosterone-driven risk-taking environments, banking was not constructed or naturalized as 
particularly masculine. Rather, as more women entered the banking sector in the era of social 
banking, gendered expectations of financial spaces were reworked in significant ways.  
Banking was seen as a safe space to work for middle-class women newly entering the 
workforce. According to Tarjani Vakil, the first CEO of a major Indian bank in the 1990s, 
“banks were well organised. It was a safe place to work, because you didn’t have to go to a 
factory, so the family didn’t object. Women went to the office, sat in an air-conditioned 
office, and were very happy… It was glamorous, and money is always glamour” (Chakrabarti 
2011). Similarly, according to K. Ramkumar, Executive Director of ICICI, “unlike in 
manufacturing, banking in a way, did not have a shop-floor (and therefore no problem of 
women having to do night shifts)… Much of the selling in the financial services industry, 
until retail exploded in the past 10 years, was done meeting people in offices” (Basu and 
Bhattacharya 2013). For middle-class women, working in the manufacturing sector required 
extended contact not only with industrial management, but also working class labor in the 
shop floors. Compared to the safety and glamour offered by the office spaces of financial 
services, work-related interactions in manufacturing would threaten reputation and 
respectability.  
In the wake of the Delhi rape case, concerns over women’s safety in the workplace 
have also increased. In a speech on gender diversity hosted by the Confederation of Indian 
Industry in November 2015, Chanda Kochhar, CEO of ICICI Bank noted the need for 
ensuring working women’s safety and security. Specifically, she announced that ICICI had 
developed Travel Safe, an in-house mobile phone application that “creates a robust security 
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ecosystem for women and ensures their security.” Though developed for ICICI employees, 
the app would be made available to “any company that wants to take it.” Facing the 
challenges of women in public spaces, the app offers some degree of security, particularly for 
female employees. We can certainly ask to what extent a mobile app will keep women safe. 
More significantly, the growing market for such applications demonstrates how women’s 
entry into public spaces of work has to be secured, including through new modes of 
surveillance. 
 
Domesticity, Care, and Finance 
It is not just that banking produced safe spaces for women; rather, contrary to Euro-
American image of masculine finance, particular forms of banking practices were naturalized 
in India as feminine. Speaking to the Economic Times, Swati Piramal, a non-executive 
director on the board of ICICI bank explains that banking comes naturally to women: 
“Women tend to be more conservative, more structured, more careful about money, good 
leaders and better team players,” (Basu and Bhattacharya 2013) she explains. Similarly, Arun 
Duggal, chairman of financial company Shriram Capital similarly adds: “Banking requires 
sound instinct and intellectual capability to analyse businesses. I feel women are better at it 
than men.” In other words, women are valued in banking for their supposed diligence and 
attention. Reasons bank managers offer for hiring women reflect the gendered conceptions of 
women’s work. These range from the perception that women employees are “sincere and 
diligent and meticulously complete their work,” to their being time conscious, as well as 
lower levels of actual involvement in union activities (Gothoskar 1995). As with other 
industries, women in banking are especially called upon to perform such emotional labor 
(Hochschild 1984).  
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The IMF’s Lagarde, in the wake of the financial crisis has argued: “When women are 
called to action in times of turbulence, it is often on account of their composure, sense of 
responsibility and great pragmatism in delicate situations” (Lagarde 2010). Women are 
considered risk-averse and would therefore have prevented the financial disaster leading to 
the “Great Recession.” Similarly, with the appointment of Janet Yellen as the first female 
Chair of the US Federal Reserve Board in 2014, media outlets wondered if “a woman at the 
top of a very male profession” (Cooper 2014) would be able to clean up the financial mess. 
As with their Indian counterparts, these women in finance are seen primarily as managers of 
money.   
Despite the emphasis on abstraction in finance, banking relies on cultivating 
“relationships” with customers and as well as colleagues. Thus, aspects of care and emotional 
labor are inherently part of the work of banking (Kar 2013). Masking the singular financial 
relationship between bank and customer, banks often allude to the affective dimensions of the 
relationship. Writing of the central bank in Japan, Annelise Riles (2004) notes how bankers 
refer to the bank as a mother, flagging a particular kind of intimate relationship. The 
relational attributes to banking are expressed through the feminized notions of care and 
support.    
On the one hand, unlike debates in the Lean In movement, middle-class and elite 
women in Indian finance rely on expansive networks of kin and domestic workers, rather 
than spouses, to provide the necessary support. Carework in the realm of banking, however, 
constantly merges with that of the domestic realm. In the widespread reporting on the 
surprising number of women in Indian banking, both reporters and the women bankers 
themselves constantly emphasize the need and ability of women to balance both the home 
and career. Unsurprisingly, there is no equivalent reporting on male bankers’ work-life 
balance. In an interview with the Financial Times, Arundhati Bhattacharya explains the 
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burden of expectations on women: “You are considered the primary caregiver in any 
situation. That pressure is extra in India… For children, for old people, for people who are 
sick at home, for anybody who needs care… Until you get your reputation made, you have to 
work twice as hard... there is always a doubt in your superior’s mind as to whether you will 
put family before your job” (Crabtree 2014). In a feature in the Economic Times (Bhakta 
2015) on four senior women in financial institutions, all focus on how women manage career 
and family obligations. Chitra Pandeya, of ICICI bank explains that “I had always believed 
that compromising on my health and my achievements was the right thing to do; even if I do 
not have 100% control at work, I should not lose control of my home.” Ashima Bhat of 
HDFC Bank is more reflexive of the multiple responsibilities women face, from managing 
the kitchen, childcare, and eldercare, particularly for in-laws: “A lot of women, who are at the 
cusp of 30 to 35 years, quit their jobs when the kids are born and family pressure is 
significant. It is not easy to leave a baby at home and come to office. I feel I have had to work 
a little extra to prove my credibility and gain my subordinates’ respect.” As with other 
women in the workforce in India, these women faced similar challenges of maintaining 
“respectable femininity” that enables attending to both work and home.  
There are, nevertheless, emerging limits to women’s success within these secure 
channels, particularly as they come up against issues of mobility and greater public visibility. 
First, public sector banking jobs with frequent transfers require high levels of mobility. 
Women who are required to balance the home and the workplace often end up refusing 
promotions on the basis that it would require them and their families to move (Mukherjee 
2013). Second, while most women have come up to the top of Indian banking through the 
corporate arm, they remain underrepresented in the retail arm—the “fighting arm of the 
organisation” or the “front-end, cutting edge jobs,” according to K. Ramkumar, the Executive 
Director of ICICI (Basu and Bhattacharyya 2013). Ramkumar explains that most women at 
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the top were corporate bankers prior to assuming their executive positions: “Chanda 
[Kocchar of ICICI] and Shikha [Sharma of Axis] briefly moved into retail [at ICICI] after 
they became directors. It helped them,” he explains. Ramkumar estimates that very few 
women venture into retail jobs. As with the BMB’s tendency to secure women within the 
domestic sphere, women bankers are secured in particular spaces of banking, while they 
remain a notable absence in the more public retail side.  
 
The Politics of Precaution 
On June 15, 2016, the Indian cabinet cleared the merger of BMB with the State Bank 
of India and five other associate banks. The merger would give SBI 25 percent of the Indian 
market share, and propel it into the top 50 banks in the world (Business Standard 2016). 
While the BMB had come into being as a political act by the Congress government of India, 
it was also dissolved by a political act of the new conservative Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) 
that sought to implement its own vision of financial inclusion (Venkatesh 2016) as well as 
public sector bank consolidation. The BJP had introduced the seven-pronged Indrahanush 
[Rainbow] plan aimed at bringing private sector actors into the governance of India’s public 
sector banks, and to streamline their functions through consolidation. 
Before the announcement of the merger, SM Swathi, the head of the BMB explained 
that she did not see the need for the merger. She noted: “My view is that [the BMB] bank 
should not be merged considering it has different mandate, which is to empower women and 
it is a specialised Bank” (Narasimhan 2016). Despite Swathi’s insistence on the unique BMB 
mandate, the Modi government thought the BMB had been made redundant as other 
commercial banks created their own women-focused products or branches (Singh 2016). In 
the weeks leading up to the announcement of SBI’s merger with the BMB, there were rumors 
that the Union Bank, another large public sector bank, was interested in the BMB. While 
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most of India’s public sector banks face a crisis of bad loans or non-performing assets 
(NPAs), the BMB has almost none. This made the BMB ideal for low-risk acquisition, and 
financial stability. Three years from the Delhi rape case and the protests that ensued, financial 
security was once more favored over other demands for change; this time, dissolving the 
women’s bank.     
When examined laterally, both narratives of women and finance in India have enabled 
financial expansion and economic security. Women as customers for new loans have 
expanded the financial markets, while women bankers have safeguarded the Indian banking 
system through forms of diligence and care. In the case of the BMB, economic risk is 
managed through the securitization of women’s bodies through credit-based empowerment 
programs. As with microfinance, the loans offered by the BMB have a “conservative bias” 
(Molyneux 2002, 182), ensconcing women in domestic spaces, rather than challenge the 
hegemony of masculine public spaces. Meanwhile, Indian women in banking defy the almost 
global naturalization of finance as masculine and tied to risk-taking behaviors. Their 
inclusion, however, ushered in by social banking, has been premised on the recognition of 
banks as a safe space for middle-class women to enter the workforce. Breaking into 
boardrooms, women bankers have not questioned the gendering of public space as masculine.  
While banking for women amasses finance capital from a new group, women in 
banking manage the security of this wealth. Claims to empower women through finance—
whether as borrowers or bankers—ultimately secures the wellbeing of the financial sector 
itself. With the growing financialization of the economy, we are faced with the question, 
“what kind of gendered order is produced and reproduced when this rationality prevails?” 
(Brown 2015, 104). Earlier studies in the feminization of labor have noted how women’s 
entry has “typically been configured so that it does not threaten men’s position of authority in 
instances of technological change and labor market restructuring” (Freeman 2000, 54). While 
 27 
the BMB offered precautious empowerment through gendered lending, women in banking 
sought to manage and guide the financial structures, while simultaneously balancing their 
own domestic spheres. Neither, while sustaining financial security, challenges Indian 
patriarchy and its capitalist formations.  
Securitization refers to the process of expanding the physical security apparatus of a 
place. Meanwhile, financial securitization is the process of transforming assets, such as loans, 
into a new kind of security through financial engineering. For example, debt securities pool 
different loans to create a new financial asset, which is then sold according to differing levels 
of risk tolerance (cf. Tett 2009). In India, securitizing women also happened through a 
process of financial engineering; creating new debt products that will empower women, and 
securitizing them in the sense of physical safety. Yet, this form of securitization reflects a low 
degree of risk tolerance for social and political change.  
In an era of financialization, risk is mobilized for economic gains by expanding the 
pool of capital available for speculation through precautious empowerment and banking for 
women. Risk, however, is managed to avoid calls for more substantive forms of social 
change (cf. Kabeer et al. 2010). Meanwhile, women bankers in India, while challenging 
global gendering of masculinity of finance, do continue to sustain the patriarchal capitalist 
division of labor in the home and workplace. As Ewald suggests, precaution has not only 
made us riskophiles but also produces inaction: the precautious turn can lead “to an 
exhaustion of innovation and therefore to a revolutionary change in society” (2002, 299). The 
challenge of gender and finance is not to increase the number of women customers or 
bankers, but to suffuse it with spirit of political risk as exemplified by the mass protests that 
plug the arteries of the capital demanding change to gender inequalities.  
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